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In recent months, as disgruntled members have leveled charges
that the [State] Bar [of California] is bloated, arrogant, oblivious
and unresponsive, the Bar has promptly done its best to verify each
indictment....
... Indeed, California bar dues are more than twice the average
of the other forty-nine states, which is approximately $200 per year.
None of this appears to be of any consequence to the Bar....
... Created in 1927, the Bar is designed to act as an arm of the
California Suprene Court with responsibility for regulating the
legal profession and promoting fair and efficient administration of
justice. The Bar has drifted, however, and become lost, its ultimate
mission obscured. It is now part magazine publisher, part real
estate investor, part travel agent, and part social critic,
commingling its responsibilities and revenues in a manner which
creates an almost constant appearance of impropriety.
It is time for the Bar to get back to basics: admissions, discipline
and educational standards.'
1. Govemor's Veto of S.B. 1145, 1997-98 Cal. Legis. Sess. (Oct. 11, 1997),
available at California State Senate, 1997-1998 Session Legislation (visited Oct. 6,
1999) <http://vww.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/sen/sb_1101-1150/sb_1145_vt_19971
01 1.html> (quoting California Governor Pete Wilson).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The comments of then-Governor Pete Wilson perhaps echo a
commonly held, nationwide belief: the State Bar of California is
arrogant.2 If the State Bar of California has been perceived historically
as aloof, then the Supreme Court of California created a public relations
nightmare-indeed, threw gasoline on a simmering inferno-with its
recent opinion in the case of Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank,
P.C. v. Superior Court ("Birbrower If').' In Birbrower II, the court held
that a New York law firm was unable to collect the majority of its fees,
which exceeded one million dollars, because some of its attorneys-
none of whom were members of the State Bar of California-had
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in California.4  This
Casenote takes the position that the Supreme Court of California's
handling of Birbrower II is defensible. This Casenote contends,
however, that the facts presented in Birbrower II expose the need for
legislatures in general, and the California Legislature in particular, to
amend unauthorized practice of law provisions. Such an amendment is
2. See, e.g., Raising the Bar, S.F. ExAmINFR, May 18, 1998, at A22 (stating that
the State Bar of California "has given ammunition to its enemies with a long record of
arrogance toward critics and questionable use of dues money for lobbying and liberal-
leaning political advocacy with which many members disagree" and that "[s]ome of its
stands had little or nothing to do with the practice of law"); Walter H. Bithell, The
California Bar Experience: A Valuable Lesson, ADvoc., Nov. 1998, at 4 ("Ultimately
the California Bar will recover, but it will never be the same proud, powerful, politically
arrogant and seemingly untouchable organization it was just a few years ago.").
3. 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998) [hereinafter Birbrower II], superseding 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d
857 (Ct. App. 1996) [hereinafter Birbrower 1], cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 291 (1998).
Birbrower II has caused a considerable amount of commentary. See, e.g., Debra Baker,
Lawyer, Go Home: Firns Negotiating Multistate Deals Should Take Heed of California
Decision on Unauthorized Practice, A.B.A. J., May 1998, at 22-23 (quoting several
predictions that the decision "sets the legal field back a quarter of a century at least," that
it only benefits California lawyers, and that it "tosses everything up in the air" and
"won't be followed and.., shouldn't be" because it's "insane"); Arthur S. Hayes, No
Trespassing: License is Required, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 19, 1998, at A4 ("A caveat to all out-
of-state attorneys: California is very territorial and frowns on both physical
encroachment and cyber-trespassing.") (emphasis omitted); Lori Tripoli, Ill Wind from
the West... State Efforts to Restrict Legal Practice Challenged by Lawyers Nationwide,
INSIDE LrrIG., Sept. 1998, at 10, 11 (quoting several criticisms of the decision as being
"out of step with the way the modem world is living in terms of legal practices,"
engaging in "protectionism, pure and simple," and creating "an economic balkanization
that is a core violation of the commerce clause").
4. See Birbrower II, supra note 3, at 7, 13.
necessary in light of the evolving, irreversible interstate nature of the
practice of law. To that end, this Casenote proposes an amendment to
California's unauthorized practice of law provision.
Part II of this Casenote provides a contextual background for
Birbrower II, including a factual summary and the case's procedural
route to the Supreme Court of California. Part III examines the core
elements, as well as the holding, of the case. Part IV examines
California's recognized exceptions to the general rule prohibiting the
unauthorized practice of law. Part IV also discusses the various would-
be exceptions to the general rule which the law firm of Birbrower,
Montalbano, Condon & Frank ("Birbrower") urged the court to adopt.
Part V proposes a legislative amendment to the unauthorized practice of
law statute in California, the purpose of which is to serve the competing,
and seemingly incongruous, goals of protecting a state's citizens from
incompetent legal representation while simultaneously recognizing the
irreversible interstate nature of the legal profession
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
Birbrower, a professional corporation, is incorporated in New York
and has its principal place of business in New York.6 The New York law
firm began representing ESQ Business Services, Inc. ("ESQ-New
York"), a New York corporation, in 1986. 7 None of the Birbrower
lawyers held a license to practice law in California.8 In 1990, Kamal
Sandhu, the sole shareholder of ESQ-New York, asked Birbrower to
review a proposed software development and marketing agreement
between ESQ-New York and Tandem Computers, Inc. ("Tandem"), a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Santa Clara
5. This proposed amendment would not have rescued Birbrower from the impact
of California's unauthorized practice of law provision. Indeed, the California
Legislature has already responded to Birbrower II by passing an amendment allowing
out-of-state attorneys to represent individuals in a private arbitration proceeding without
running afoul of California's unauthorized practice of law provisions. See CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 1282.4 (West Supp. 1999); see also infra Part IV.B.2. Rather, the
proposed amendment is intended to apply outside the context of arbitration and
litigation, which includes, most notably, transactions. Adopting this amendment would
avoid the Birbrower II-type scenario of waiting for a court to inform an out-of-state
transactions attorney that the court's hands are tied by California's unauthorized practice
of law provisions and the Legislature's silence regarding an out-of-state attorney
exception. See infra Part V.
6. See Birbrower II, supra note 3, at 3.
7. See id. at 14.
8. See id.
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County, California.9  The agreement gave Tandem worldwide
distribution rights to software created by ESQ-New York.'0 The
agreement further provided that it would be governed by California law
and that disputes were to be resolved by arbitration under the rules of the
American Arbitration Association. This is the agreement which ESQ-
New York and Tandem eventually adopted.'
After the ESQ-New York/Tandem agreement was executed, a second
corporation, ESQ Business Services, Inc. ("ESQ-California"), was
incorporated under the laws of California. 3 The principal shareholder of
ESQ-California was Iqbal Sandhu, the former vice president of ESQ-
New York and brother of Kamal Sandhu, ESQ-New York's sole
shareholder." In 1991, ESQ-California consulted Birbrower concerning
Tandem's performance under the contract.15 In 1992, ESQ-New York
and ESQ-California jointly hired Birbrower, via a contingency fee
agreement executed in New York, to resolve the dispute with Tandem,
including the investigation and possible prosecution of claims against
Tandem. 6 The New York-executed contingency fee agreement was
subsequently modified into a fixed fee agreement in California.'
Birbrower lawyers made several trips to California in an effort to
resolve the Tandem dispute. While in California, Birbrower lawyers
met with officers from ESQ-New York and ESQ-California, as well as
with representatives from Tandem. 9 The lawyers also interviewed
prospective arbitrators and participated in negotiating a possible
settlement of the dispute with Tandem.20 On February 12, 1993,
Birbrower filed an arbitration proceeding with the American Arbitration
Association in San Francisco, California on behalf of ESQ-New York
and ESQ-California and against Tandem.2 The dispute was eventually
settled before any arbitration hearings were held.'
9. See id. at 3, 14.














1. The Trial Court
In January of 1994, ESQ-California and its principal shareholder,
Iqbal Sandhu, sued Birbrower for malpractice. 3 Birbrower removed the
case to federal district court and filed a counterclaim to recover its fees
under the fee agreement, which exceeded one million dollars.2 After the
case was remanded back to state court, ESQ-California moved for
summary adjudication on Birbrower's claims that ESQ-California
breached the fee agreement.25 ESQ-California contended that Birbrower
lawyers had practiced law in California without a California license and
without associating local counsel.26  Such a practice, ESQ-California
argued, constitutes the unlawful practice of law as defined by section
6125 of the Business and Professions Code.27 Accordingly, ESQ-
California contended that Birbrower's unlawful practice of law rendered
the fee agreement unenforceable.'
The trial court granted ESQ-California's motion, concluding that: (1)
the Birbrower attorneys were not licensed to practice law in California;
(2) the Birbrower attorneys had not associated California counsel; (3) the
Birbrower attorneys had provided legal services in the state of
California; and (4) "[t]he law is clear that no one may recover
compensation for services as an attorney in this state unless he or she [is]
a member of the state bar at the time those services [are] performed."29
The trial court left open the possibility that Birbrower could recover fees
for work that was performed in New York.30
2. Court of Appeal
Birbrower petitioned the California Court of Appeal for the Sixth
District, seeking a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its
prior order.3  The Court of Appeal denied the writ?2  The court
23. See id.
24. See id. at 4.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.; see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6125 (West Supp. 1999). Section
6125 provides that "[n]o person shall practice law in California unless the person is an
active member of the State Bar." Id.
28. See Birbrower II, supra note 3, at 4.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. See Birbrower I, supra note 3, at 859.
32. See id.
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concluded that the attorney fee agreement was void and unenforceable
because it included payment for services rendered in California.3 It
based this conclusion upon the determination that the client was a
California client involved in a California dispute between California
parties.' Moreover, the court found that the contract was entered into in
California and was to be governed by California law.35  Lastly,
Birbrower "never associated with California counsel, yet it engaged in
numerous acts in California that constituted the unauthorized practice of
law in [California].',36
III. THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
The Supreme Court of California granted review of the case in order
to determine whether Birbrower's actions and services performed while
representing ESQ-New York and ESQ-California constituted the
unauthorized practice of law under section 6125 of the California
Business and Professions Code37 and, if so, whether a violation of
section 6125 renders a fee agreement entirely unenforceable." The court
began its analysis by looking to the text of section 6125, which provides
that "[n]o person shall practice law in California unless the person is an
active member of the State Bar."39 The court then pointed out that "[n]o
one may recover compensation for services as an attorney at law in this
state unless [the person] was at the time the services were performed a
member of [t]he State Bar., 40  In determining whether Birbrower
violated the unauthorized practice of law provision of section 6125, the
court analyzed two discrete aspects of the provision. First, the court
addressed the issue of what it means to "practice law."' Second, the
court attempted to define when someone engages in such activity "in
33. See id. at 863. It is worth noting that the court of appeal, unlike the trial court,
concluded that Birbrower was totally precluded from recovering any fees under the
agreement, including fees generated while in New York, because the fee agreement
encapsulated payment for California services. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 864.
37. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6125 (West Supp. 1999).
38. See Birbrower II, supra note 3, at 5.
39. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6125 (West Supp. 1999).
40. Birbrower II, supra note 3, at 5 (second alteration in original) (quoting Hardy
v. San Fernando Valley Chamber of Commerce, 222 P.2d 314, 317 (Cal. Ct. App.
1950)).
41. See id. at 5.
California."
A. What Does It Mean to "Practice Law" in California?
The court had relatively little trouble determining that Birbrower
"practiced law" in California.43 According to the court, the practice of
law entails "performing services in a court of justice in any matter
depending therein throughout its various stages and in conformity with
the adopted rules of procedure." The court further determined that the
practice of law also entails the giving of legal advice, the drafting of
legal documents, and the preparation of contracts, irrespective of
whether these items are associated with litigation.45
Under this definition, few would dispute the conclusion that
Birbrower was practicing law. Birbrower was hired by ESQ-New York
and ESQ-California in order to resolve a contractual dispute with
Tandem, including the investigation and possible prosecution of claims
against Tandem. 6 Birbrower lawyers made several trips to California in
an effort to resolve the Tandem dispute and, to that end, they met with
officers from ESQ-New York and ESQ-California, as well as with
representatives from Tandem.47  The lawyers also interviewed
prospective arbitrators and participated in negotiating a possible
settlement of the dispute with Tandem48  Finally, Birbrower filed an
arbitration proceeding with the American Arbitration Association in San
Francisco, California on behalf of ESQ-New York and ESQ-California
and against Tandem. 49 Against this factual backdrop, the majority of the
court had no trouble concluding that Birbrower had engaged in the
practice of law.0
42. See id. at 5-6.
43. See id. at 13.
44. Id. at 5 (quoting People ex rel. Lawyers' Inst. of San Diego v. Merchants'
Protective Corp., 209 P. 363, 365 (Cal. 1922)).
45. See id. (citing Merchants', 209 P. at 365).




50. See id. at 13. The dissent, however, found the issue to be a more difficult
question. See generally id. at 13-18 (Kennard, ., dissenting). One "practices law," in
the view of the dissent, when one represents another in a judicial proceeding or
participates in an activity "requiring the application of that degree of legal knowledge
and technique possessed only by a trained legal mind." Id. at 13 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting) (citing Baron v. City of Los Angeles, 469 P.2d 353, 357-58 (Cal. 1970)).
Under this definition and in light of the factual circumstances surrounding Birbrower's
activities, the dissent was of the opinion that the case presented a factual dispute as to
whether Birbrower "practiced law." See id. at 13-14 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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B. What Does It Mean to Practice Law "In California"?
After concluding that Birbrower had "practiced law," the court
addressed the more difficult issue of whether Birbrower had practiced
law "in California."5 The court, after noting the relative dearth of case
law interpreting the meaning of practicing law "in California,"
determined that "the practice of law 'in California' entails sufficient
contact with the California client to render the nature of the legal service
a clear legal representation."52  The test for determining whether an
individual has practiced law "in California," at least when the individual
is an attorney licensed to practice in another jurisdiction, is "whether the
unlicensed lawyer engaged in sufficient activities in the state, or created
a continuing relationship with the California client that included legal
duties and obligations.""
In fleshing out this standard, the court attempted to provide some
guidance.14 At one end of the continuum, an out-of-state attorney does
not necessarily practice law "in California" when she practices
California law in another jurisdiction or when she "virtually" enters
California by telephone, facsimile, e-mail, satellite, and the like.5
Additionally, "[m]ere fortuitous or attenuated contacts will not sustain a
finding that the unlicensed lawyer practiced law 'in California."' 6 At
the other end of the continuum, however, the test for determining
whether an out-of-state attorney has practiced law "in California" "does
not necessarily depend on or require the unlicensed lawyer's physical
presence in the state."'57 Physical presence in California is only one of
many factors courts should consider in determining whether section
6125 has been violated. 8 In addition to looking at an out-of-state
attorney's actions quantitatively, courts should consider the nature of the
unlicensed lawyer's activities in California.59 Perhaps realizing the
51. See id. at 5-7.
52. Id. at5.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 5-6.
55. See id. at 6.
56. Id. at 5.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. See id. In other words, an out-of-state attorney violates section 6125,
according to the Supreme Court of California, if she engages in X amount of activities
over a certain period of time, A, or if she engages in Y amount of activities (Y being less
than X) over a different period of time, B (B constituting a longer period of time than A).
A compelling argument can be made that this "formula" provides inadequate guidance to
difficulty in applying these principles, the court ultimately admitted that
each case will have to be evaluated on its facts.' The court, in
evaluating the facts of this case,61 concluded that Birbrower practiced
extensively "in California" and, hence, engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law. 2
C. To What Extent Was the Birbrower Fee Agreement Enforceable?
In light of the determination that Birbrower had engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law, the court next considered the issue of
whether the Birbrower/ESQ fee agreement was enforceable at all and, if
so, to what extent. The court of appeal had determined that "the attorney
fee agreement [wa]s void and unenforceable for the reason that it
include[d] payment for services rendered in California."63 The Supreme
Court determined that the contract was severable.6 Hence, Birbrower
was allowed to pursue the fees attributable to the services performed for
ESQ in New York, at least to the extent that the services did not violate
section 6125.65
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO SECTION 6125
With over one million dollars at stake, Birbrower understandably
attempted to satisfy one of the exceptions to the general rule articulated
in section 6125. It additionally advanced reasons why new exceptions
should be recognized. Part IV.A examines some recognized exceptions
to section 6125, while Part IV.B discusses the exceptions which
Birbrower unsuccessfully urged the court to adopt.
out-of-state attorneys-particularly transactions attorneys-as to whether they are
violating section 6125. This problem, as well as a proposed solution, will be explored in
more detail infra Part V.
60. See Birbrower II, supra note 3, at 6.
61. See supra Part II.A.
62. See Birbrower II, supra note 3, at 7. The dissent did not address the issue of
what constitutes the practice of law "in California" but, rather, focused attention solely
on the issue of what constitutes the practice of law. See generally id. at 13-18 (Kennard,
J., dissenting).
63. Birbrover 1, supra note 3, at 863 (emphasis omitted); see supra note 33 and
accompanying text.
64. See Birbrower If, supra note 3, at 11-13. California's version of the doctrine
of severability provides that "[w]here a contract has several distinct objects, of which
one at least is lawful, and one at least is unlawful, in whole or in part, the contract is void
as to the latter and valid as to the rest." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1599 (West 1982).
65. See Birbrower II, supra note 3, at 12-13.
880
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A. California's Recognized Exceptions to Section 6125
California recognizes several exceptions to the general rule
prohibiting individuals from violating the unauthorized practice of law
provision embodied in section 6125, a few of which the Supreme Court
addressed.
1. The Pro Hac Vice Exception: California Rule of Court 983
California Rule of Court 9836 provides:
A person who is not a member of the State Bar of California but who is a
member in good standing of and eligible to practice before the bar of any United
States court or the highest court in any state.., and who has been retained to
appear in a particular cause pending in a court of this state, may in the discretion
of such court be permitted upon written application to appear as counsel pro hac
vice, provided that an active member of the State Bar of California is associated
as attorney of record. No person is eligible to appear as counsel pro hac vice
pursuant to this rule if (1) he is a resident of the State of California, or (2) he is
regularly employed in the State of California, or (3) he is regularly engaged in
substantial business, professional, or other activities in the State of California.
Absent special circumstances, repeated appearances6pJy any person pursuant to
this rule shall be a cause for denial of an application.
Birbrower could not avail itself of this exception for a number of
reasons. First, Birbrower had not "been retained to appear in a particular
cause pending. '0 Indeed, Birbrower had been retained, inter alia, to file
an arbitration demand.69 Thus, the firm could not have been retained to
appear in a pending action. This is because it appeared when it filed the
action, which necessarily precedes an action being considered
"pending." Second, the action was not "pending in a court of this
state."70 Granted, the action had been filed in the San Francisco office of
the American Arbitration Association. Assuming arguendo that the
arbitration association's tribunal is a "court," an argument can be made
that the action was pending in a court "in" California. However, this
argument is specious for the obvious reason that the provision is
intended to regulate California state courts. Indeed, the American
Arbitration Association is a private, nonprofit organization7' and its
66. CAL. R. CT. 983.
67. Id. 983(a).
68. Id.
69. See Birbrower II, supra note 3, at 14.
70. CAL. R. CT. 983(a).
71. See JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DiSPuTE RESOLUTION WITH FORms § 1.52, at
tribunals are not bound by the California Rules of Court.12
Lastly, Birbrower did not associate an active member of the State Bar
of California as attorney of record." This fact no doubt weighed heavily
on the outcome of this case not only within the pro hac vice context-
which did not command considerable attention from the court because
Birbrower obviously did not satisfy the requirements-but also
throughout the entire litigation. 4
2. The Federal Court Exemption
The court recognized the fact that the State Bar does not regulate the
practice of law in California federal courts. 75 Thus, an out-of-state
attorney could, in theory, make an appearance in a federal court without
15 (2d ed. 1997).
72. At the risk of professing the obvious, the California Rules of Court apply only
to California courts. Cf. Blanton v. Womancare Inc., 696 P.2d 645, 648-49 (Cal. 1985).
In Blanton, the Supreme Court of California declared that
[p]rivate arbitration occurs only pursuant to agreement, and it is the agreement
which determines the details of the process. The parties are themselves
responsible for payment of the arbitrator and associated costs.... While
[California law] provides mechanisms for judicial enforcement of the
agreement and confirmation of the award both mechanisms are extraneous to
the process and, ordinarily, to the contemplation of the parties. Typically,
those who enter into arbitration agreements expect that their dispute will be
resolved without necessity for any contact with the courts.
Id. at 648 n.5 (citations omitted).
73. See Birbrower II, supra note 3, at 4 & n.3.
74. The court of appeal mentioned this fact several times. See Birbrower I, supra
note 3, at 862-64. The supreme court, by contrast, was of the opinion that association
with local counsel would have been neither necessary nor sufficient to save Birbrower
from the hammer of section 6125. See Birbrower I, supra note 3, at 4 n.3 ("Contrary to
the trial court's [and the court of appeal's] implied assumption, no statutory exception to
section 6125 allows out-of-state attorneys to practice law in California as long as they
associate local counsel in good standing with the State Bar."). This "association of local
counsel" issue will be explored infra Part V.
75. See Birbrower II, supra note 3, at 6-7. Although the State Bar of California
technically does not regulate attorneys who appear in federal court, all federal districts in
California require attorneys to be members of the State Bar of California in order to be
admitted to practice in those districts. See N.D. CAL. Civ. LocAL R. 11-1(b) ("FA]n
applicant for admission to membership in the bar of this court must be an attorney who is
an active member in good standing of the Bar of the State of California."); E.D. CAL.
Cv. LOCAL R. 83-180(a) ("Admission to and continuing membership in the Bar of this
Court are limited to attorneys who are active members in good standing of the State Bar
of California."); C.D. CAL. Civ. LOcAL R. 2.2.1 ("Admission to and continuing
membership in the Bar of this Court is limited to persons of good moral character who
are active members in good standing of the State Bar of California."); S.D. CAL. CIV.
LOCAL R. 83.3(c)(1)(a) ("Admission to and continuing membership in the bar of this
court is limited to attorneys of good moral character who are active members in good
standing of the State Bar of California."). Thus, these local rules amount to a de facto
State Bar regulation of the federal bar. Accordingly, this is a rather hollow exception for
out-of-state attorneys.
[VOL. 36: 871, 1999] Birbrower
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEV
being a member of the State Bar of California. 6 However, the exception
did not apply because there was no action pending in a federal court.
Indeed, Birbrower did not even attempt to invoke this exception.
3. Arbitration and Conciliation of International Disputes:
A Limited Arbitration Exception
The court recognized that there is an exception to section 6125 when
parties arbitrate an international commercial disputer ' This exception
provides that, when applicable, "[t]he parties may appear in person or be
represented or assisted by any person of their choice. A person assisting
or representing a party need not be a member of the legal profession or
licensed to practice law in California."78 The pertinent issue, then, was
whether the exception covered any of Birbrower's activities and, if so, to
what extent.
As a threshold issue, the exception applies only "to international
commercial arbitration and conciliation."'79 An arbitration agreement is
"international" if, inter alia, "Itihe parties to an arbitration or conciliation
agreement have, at the time of the conclusion of that agreement, their
places of business in different states."' At the time ESQ-New York and
Tandem executed their software development and marketing agreement,
ESQ-New York's and Tandem's places of business were New York and
California, respectively.8' Thus, ESQ-New York and Tandem arguably
had, at the time of the conclusion of their agreement, their places of
business in different "states."
However, California's international arbitration provision is an almost
verbatim copy of the United Nations' model provision.' This model
provision is intended to provide various sovereign nations with a
uniform method for resolving commercial disputes.83 There is no
76. This theoretical ability to make an appearance, however, does not normally
translate into a practical reality. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
77. See Birbrower II, supra note 3, at 7; CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1297.351 (West
Supp. 1999).
78. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.351 (West Supp. 1999)
79. Id. § 1297.11 (emphasis added).
80. Id. § 1297.13(a) (emphasis added).
81. ESQ-Califomia was not incorporated until after ESQ-New York and Tandem
had executed their software development and marketing agreement. See Birbrower II,
supra note 3, at 14.
82. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, 24 I.L.M. 1302 (1985).
83. See generally id.; cf. Andre J. Brunel, Note, A Proposal to Adopt UNCITRAL's
indication that the California provision should be interpreted differently
than the United Nations' model provision, which uses the term
"international" in its ordinary context.' Accordingly, Birbrower was
unable to satisfy the requirements of this exception. Indeed, the
Supreme Court of California tersely assumed without discussion that the
exception did not apply.85
4. No California Exception Applicable to Birbrower's Case
In sum, then, the court flatly rejected the notion that Birbrower
satisfied any of California's recognized exceptions to the general rule
prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law. Given such rejection,
Birbrower turned its attention to the task of attempting to convince the
court to adopt a new exception. Birbrower advanced a number of
arguments in favor of crafting new exceptions to the general
unauthorized practice of law provision.
B. Birbrower's Proffered Exceptions
1. The "Out-of-State Attorney" Exception
Birbrower argued that section 6125 is not intended to prohibit out-of-
state attorneys from limited practice in California; rather, it is intended
to prohibit nonattorney imposters from practicing law.86 Birbrower
further contended that applying section 6125 to out-of-state attorneys
does not further the underlying policy rationale of the provision, which
Birbrower articulated as providing protection to Californians from
incompetent legal advice and representation.8 7 The court responded by
looking to the language of the statute, which the court deemed to be
unambiguous. The court concluded that "It]he statute does not
differentiate between attorneys and nonattorneys, nor does it excuse a
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as Federal Law, 25 TEx. INT'L L.J.
43, 62 (1990) ("After the final drafting of the Model Law in 1985, the United Nations
General Assembly recommended its adoption by countries, not by their political
subdivisions.").
84. See Albert S. Golbert & Daniel M. Kolkey, California's Adoption of a Code
for hiternational Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation, 10 LOYOLA L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 583, 584 (1988) ("Under the [International Commercial Arbitration and
Conciliation C]ode, an arbitration or conciliation is international if... the parties to the
arbitration or conciliation agreement have their places of business in different
countries .... ).
85. See Birbrower II, supra note 3, at 9.
86. See id. at 7.
87. See id. at 8.
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person who is a member of another state bar.""8 Moreover, the policy
underpinnings of section 6125, so stated the court, are not furthered by
adopting Birbrower's proffered application for "the obvious fact that
other states' laws may differ substantially from California law.
Competence in one jurisdiction does not necessarily guarantee
competence in another."89 The court further observed that "a decision to
except out-of-state attorneys licensed in their own jurisdictions from
section 6125 is more appropriately left to the California Legislature."90
2. The "Private Arbitration" Exception
Birbrower alternatively argued that the court should extend the
international commercial arbitration exception to all work incident to
private arbitration.9' The underlying policy of section 6125-to protect
Californians from receiving incompetent legal representation and
advice-is not furthered by failing to recognize an arbitration exception,
argued Birbrower, because there are fundamental differences between
private arbitration and legal proceedings.2  These differences include
"procedural differences relating to discovery, rules of evidence,
88. Id. at7.
89. Id. at 8.
90. Id. (emphasis added). One might wonder whether such an exception is "more"
appropriately left to the Legislature. The Legislature undoubtedly has the authority to
amend its own statute. However, the Supreme Court of California, in an opinion crafted
the same year as the Birbrower II decision, declared that "the power to regulate the
practice of law, including the power to admit and to discipline attorneys, has long been
recognized to be among the inherent powers of... courts." In re Attorney Discipline
System, 967 P.2d 49, 54 (Cal. 1998). Additionally, the court observed that "'[i]n each
state it is the supreme court, with or without the legislative approval, that dictates the
standards for education, admission and discipline of attorneys."' Id. (emphasis added)
(quoting Robert J. Martineau, The Supreme Court and State Regulation of the Legal
Profession, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 199, 202 (1981)). Moreover, "[a]dmission to the
bar is a judicial function, and members of the bar are officers of the court, subject to
discipline by the court. Hence, under the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers,
the court has inherent and primary regulatory power." Id. at 55 (emphasis omitted)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). In other words, while the Legislature has the
power to decide what will happen to individuals who engage in the unauthorized practice
of law, the Supreme Court has the "primary regulatory" power, even "without
Legislative approval," to decide who is a member of the Bar and, thus, who is subject to
the proscription of section 6125. Accordingly, it seems to be a slight overstatement to
assert that the Legislature is the "more" appropriate body to remedy this problem. In any
event, the author proposes a possible legislative solution in the form of an out-of-state
attorney exception to section 6125. See infra Part V.
91. See Birbrower II, supra note 3, at 8-9.
92. See id. at 8.
compulsory process, cross-examination of witnesses, and other areas."93
Indeed, the dissent was receptive to Birbrower's argument, stating that
"arbitration proceedings are not governed or constrained by the rule of
law; therefore, representation of another in an arbitration proceeding,
including the activities necessary to prepare for the arbitration hearing,
does not necessarily require a trained legal mind [and, thus, does not
necessarily violate section 6125]."' 4
The court, while recognizing a strong public policy in favor of
encouraging and facilitating arbitration, replied by stating that there is an
equally strong public policy "favoring the practice of law in California
by licensed State Bar members."95 This countervailing interest, coupled
with Legislative silence regarding the issue of private arbitration,
sufficiently outweighed the perceived need to craft an ad hoc arbitration
exception to section 6125.96 Accordingly, the court concluded that
"[a]ny exception for arbitration is best left to the Legislature, which has
the authority to determine qualifications for admission to the State Bar
and to decide what constitutes the practice of law."'
93. Id.
94. Id. at 17 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at9.
96. See id.
97. Id. at 9; but see supra note 90. The court's treatment of the arbitration issue
caused quite a stir. Prior to Birbrower II, California law provided that "[a] party to...
arbitration has the right to be represented by an attorney at any proceeding or hearing in
arbitration." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282.4 (West 1982), amended by CAL. CIV. PROc.
CODE § 1282.4 (West Supp. 1999). Prior to Birbroiver II, "the common understanding
of practitioners and arbitrators ha[d] always been that attorneys are not required to be
admitted to practice in [California]" because "attorneys who represent non-resident
corporate clients in arbitration [frequently] are not admitted formally to practice in
California." Arbitration Exception for Out-of-State Lawyers, Hearing on A.B. 2086
Before Assembly Judiciary Comm., 1997-98 Cal. Legis. Sess. (May 8, 1998), available
at The California State Assembly, Bill Information (visited Oct. 6, 1999)
<http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/acsframeset2text.html> (intrasite search required to
access hearing information). This practice was not perceived as problematic because
"arbitration is a non-judicial forum to resolve disputes." Id. Thus, the California
Legislature "t[ook] up the Court's invitation [to craft an arbitration exception to section
6125] and declare[d] that non-California attorneys may represent parties in arbitration"
because Birbrower II "threaten[ed] to chill the promising use of arbitration in
California." Id. at 1, 2.
In taking up the Court's invitation to create an arbitration exception, the Legislature
passed the following amendment:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including Section 6125 of the
Business and Professions Code, an attorney admitted to the bar of any other
state may represent the parties in the course of, or in connection with, an
arbitration proceeding in this state, provided that the attorney, if not admitted
to the State Bar of California, timely files the certificate described in
subdivision (c) and the attorney's appearance is approved by the arbitrator, the
arbitrators, or the arbitral forum.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282.4(b) (West Supp. 1999). The Legislature clarified its
intent in stating that
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3. The "Federal Preemption" Exception
Birbrower raised a belated, half-hearted contention that federal
arbitration law preempted California's section 6125 and, as such, the
court should recognize a federal preemption exception. Thus, Birbrower
argued, it should not be precluded by section 6125 from collecting all of
its fees under the fee agreement with ESQ-New York." In light of the
fact that the ESQ-New York/Tandem agreement contained a California
choice of law clause, the court found Birbrower's reliance upon federal
law to be somewhat disingenuous." Additionally, the court concluded
that Birbrower had not carried its burden of showing that California law
conflicted with federal law."° Moreover, the court held that, in any
event, federal law did not preempt California's arbitration provisions.'0 '
Accordingly, the Court found the contention to be without merit.' 2
4. The "Interstate Nature of the Practice of Law" Exception
Birbrower urged the court to recognize the fact that the legal
profession is evolving into an increasingly interstate profession, such
that "[m]ultistate relationships are a common part of today's society and
are to be dealt with in commonsense fashion.""0 3  Birbrower further
asserted that "[i]n many situations, strict adherence to rules prohibiting
the unauthorized practice of law by out-of-state attorneys would be
'grossly impractical and inefficient.""' 4  Hence, Birbrower contended,
[i]n enacting the amendments to ... section [1282.4] . . . it is the intent of the
Legislature to respond to the holding in [Birbrower III to provide a procedure
for nonresident attorneys who are not licensed in this state to appear in
California arbitration proceedings.... Except as otherwise specifically
provided in... section [1282.4], it is the Legislature's intent that nothing
in... section [1282.4] is intended to expand or restrict the ability of a party
prior to the decision in [Birbrower fl] to elect to be represented by any person
in a nonjudicial arbitration proceeding, to the extent those rights or abilities
existed prior to [Birbrower fl]. To the extent that [Birbrower I] is interpreted
to expand or restrict that right or ability pursuant to the laws of this state,
[Birbrower I] is hereby abrogated except as specifically provided in...
section [1282.4].
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282.4(i)(1), (3) (West Supp. 1999).





103. Id. at 10 (quoting In re Estate of Waring, 221 A.2d 193, 197 (N.J. 1966)).
104. Id. (quoting Waring, 221 A.2d at 197).
section 6125 should be inapplicable to the case at bar. Although the
court purported to "recognize the need to acknowledge and, in certain
cases, accommodate the multistate nature of law practice," it ultimately
rejected Birbrower's invitation to carve out an exception on the facts
before it.'O5
5. The "Full Disclosure" Exception
Birbrower asserted that ESQ-California had actual knowledge that the
Birbrower attorneys were not licensed to practice in California."° Thus,
Birbrower argued, California should follow some other jurisdictions in
recognizing an exception to the unauthorized practice of law
proscription when the "out-of-state attorney 'makes a full disclosure to
his [or her] client of his [or her] lack of local license and does not
conceal or misrepresent the true facts.""'  The court declined to
recognize such an exception, however, because such an exception
contravened the plain language of section 6125.03
6. No Judicially Crafted Exception to Section 6125for Birbrower
Birbrower raised numerous arguments in support of its contention that
the court should adopt an exception allowing Birbrower to collect its
fees. Granted, Birbrower is not the most sympathetic "victim" of section
6125's application. After all, most observers would probably deem
Birbrower, a law firm consisting of about fourteen attorneys,'0 to be on
notice that it might have been violating California's unauthorized
practice of law provision. Thus, few can seriously fault the Supreme
Court of California for failing to carve out an ad hoc exception to section
6125. Birbrower could have avoided this litigation simply by informing
its client that it needed to retain California counsel. In this regard, the
court's decision not to create an exception is defensible. However, the
facts in Birbrower 11 raise serious questions as to the long-term viability
of California's seemingly antiquated unauthorized practice of law
provision, particularly in light of the reality that it is becoming
105. Id. Birbrower's argument illustrates the need for unauthorized practice of law
provisions to recognize the interstate nature of the legal profession. Accordingly, this
countervailing interest will be addressed within the context of a proposed amendment to
section 6125. See infra Part V.
106. See Birbrower II, supra note 3, at 11.
107. Id. (quoting C. D. Sumner, Annotation, Right of Attorney Admitted in One
State to Recover Compensation for Services Rendered in Another State Where He Was
Not Admitted to the Bar, 11 A.L.R.3d 907, 910 (1967)).
108. See id.
109. See Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. (visited Oct. 6, 1999)
<http://www.rocklandlaw.com/martindale.htm>.
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increasingly difficult for law firms to contain their practices solely
within the borders of a single state."0
V. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SECTION 6125 OF
THE CALIFORNIA BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE"'
If taken too literally, Birbrower II interprets section 6125 as
prohibiting a broad spectrum of activities undertaken by out-of-state
attorneys on a daily basis. On the other hand, section 6125, while rarely
enforced criminally,"' gives courts a powerful weapon as a means of
110. The drafters of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility recognized this
dilemma.
Much of clients' business crosses state lines. People are mobile, moving
from state to state. Many metropolitan areas cross state lines. It is common
today to have a single economic and social community involving more than
one state. The business of a single client may involve legal problems in
several states.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 3-9 n.8 (1980) (quotations omitted).
Accordingly, the Model Code provides that
[i]n furtherance of the public interest, the legal profession should discourage
regulation that unreasonably imposes territorial limitations upon the right of a
lawyer to handle the legal affairs of his client or upon the opportunity of a
client to obtain the services of a lawyer of his choice in all matters.
Id. EC 3-9. The drafters of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct continue this
theme, providing that "[t]he legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special
responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its
regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or
self-interested concerns of the bar." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT
Preamble 11 (1983).
111. A copy of this Casenote will be sent to the appropriate California Assembly
members and Senators for consideration. It is worth noting that California has a unique
opportunity to set a trend for other states to follow. Indeed, no other state has adopted
the type of provision proposed in this Casenote. A Birbrower l-type argument calling
for a judicial ad hoe exception has been raised and rejected in a few courts. See, e.g.,
Ranta v. McCarney, 391 N.W.2d 161, 163-66 (N.D. 1986); In re Peterson, 163 B.R. 665,
672-75 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994).
The drafters of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct have attempted to create a
streamlined method for determining which state's disciplinary provisions apply when an
attorney is potentially subject to more than one state's rules of professional conduct. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5 (amended 1993). Rule 8.5 has no
bearing on the California issues presented in this Casenote for two reasons. First,
California has declined to adopt the Model Rules, which undoubtedly provides additional
ammunition for those who perceive the State Bar of California as arrogant. Second, Rule
8.5 addresses only disciplinary matters. Section 6125, by contrast, is a criminal
provision. Thus, section 6125 would have to be amended even if California chose to
adopt the Model Rules.
112. Violation of section 6125 is a criminal misdemeanor. See CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 6126(a) (West 1990).
minimizing the number of instances where Californians receive
incompetent legal advice. Given that section 6125 was drafted in
1939,"' it is not surprising that the drafters did not envision the evolving
interstate nature of the legal profession. Accordingly, section 6125
should be amended in such a fashion as to balance the competing
interests of Californians' need for competent legal advice and the nearly
invisible geographic boundaries of states vis- -vis today's business and
technological climate. In light of the Court's position that "a decision to
except out-of-state attorneys licensed in their own jurisdictions from
section 6125 is more appropriately left to the California legislature,
'"14
the following is a proposed legislative amendment to section 6125.
Section 6125 currently provides that "[n]o person shall practice law in
California unless the person is an active member of the State Bar.""' 5 It
is submitted that section 6125 should be amended to read as follows:
(a) No person shall practice law in California unless the person is
an active member of the State Bar.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), an attorney admitted to the
bar of any other state may represent a party, the
representation of which would otherwise violate subsection
(a), provided that the attorney timely files the certificate
described in subdivision (c) and the certificate is approved by
the State Bar of California, the approval of which shall not be
denied unreasonably. If the application is approved by the
State Bar, the attorney may represent the party named in the
application for a period not exceeding one year.
(c) Prior to the representation described in subsection (b), the
attorney described in subsection (b) shall serve a certificate
on the State Bar of California. The certificate shall state all
of the following:
(1) The attorney's residence and office address.
(2) The client's name and business or residence address.
(3) A general description of the nature of the representation.
(4) The courts before which the attorney has been admitted
to practice and the dates of admission.
(5) That the attorney is currently a member in good standing
of, and eligible to practice before, the bar of those
courts.
113. See State Bar Act of 1939, ch. 34, sec. 1, § 6125, 1939 Cal. Stat. 347, 359.
114. Birbrower II, supra note 3, at 8.
115. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6125 (West Supp. 1999).
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(6) That the attorney is not currently on suspension or
disbarred from the practice of law before the bar of any
court.
(7) That the attorney is not a resident of the State of
California.
(8) That the attorney is not regularly employed in the State
of California.
(9) That the attorney is not regularly engaged in substantial
business, professional, or other activities in the State of
California.
(10) That the attorney agrees to be subject to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state with respect to the law of this
state governing the conduct of attorneys to the same
extent as a member of the State Bar of California.
(11) Whether the attorney has ever applied for:
(A) A temporary exemption under this section;
(B) A pro hac vice exemption under California Rule of
Court 983;
(C) An exemption under section 1282.4 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure; or
(D) Any other exemption from the unauthorized practice
of law provision of subsection (a).
For each exemption the attorney has applied for
under subsection (c)(1 1), the attorney shall state the date
of each application, a description of the circumstances
prompting the application (including the name and
location of the court, arbitral forum, and the like, if
applicable), and whether the application was granted or
denied. Absent special circumstances, repeated
applications seeking any type of exemption referred to in
subsection (c)(1 1) shall be a reasonable cause for denial
of an application.
(12) The name, address, and telephone number of the active
member of the State Bar of California who has agreed in
writing to be counsel of record.
(d) The active member of the State Bar of California who agrees
to be counsel of record as described in subsection (c)(12)
shall be subject to professional discipline and civil liability
for any and all acts or omissions by the out-of-state attorney
described in subsection (b) to the same extent as if the active
member of the State Bar had committed the act or omitted
the act himself.
(e) An attorney who files a certificate containing false
information or who otherwise fails to comply with the
standards of professional conduct required of members of
the State Bar of California shall be subject to the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the State Bar.
(f) An applicant for permission to represent a party under this
section shall pay a reasonable fee not exceeding $50 to the
State Bar of California. The amount of the fee shall be fixed
by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of California:
(1) To defray the expenses of administering the provisions of
this rule which are applicable to the State Bar and the
incidental consequences resulting from such provisions;
and
(2) Partially to defray the expenses of administering the
board's other responsibilities to enforce the provisions of
the State Bar Act relating to the competent delivery of
legal services and the incidental consequences resulting
therefrom.
(g) This section neither enlarges nor restricts the applicability of
California Rule of Court 983, section 1282.4 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure, or any other judicial or
legislative provision exempting individuals from subsection
(a).
As is perhaps readily apparent, this proposed amendment to section
6125 is an amalgamation and metamorphosis of California Rule of Court
983 and section 1282.4 of the California Code of Civil Procedure."
6
Subsection (a) states the general unauthorized practice of law rule as it
currently exists. This rule, as the Birbrower II decision makes
abundantly clear, is absolutely essential in order to minimize the risk
that Californians will receive incompetent legal representation and
advice. Subsection (b) provides out-of-state attorneys with an escape
hatch from subsection (a). This "out-of-state attorney" exception would
allow out-of-state attorneys to continue representations that are currently
prohibited under section 6125. In order to qualify for the exception,
however, the out-of-state attorney must satisfy the somewhat onerous
requirements proposed as amendments to section 6125.
116. See CAL. R. CT. 983; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282.4 (West Supp. 1999).
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Subsection (c) requires the out-of-state attorney to file a certificate
with, and be approved by, the State Bar of California prior to
commencing the representation. It further limits the exemption to one
year. The filing contains various disclosure requirements, most of which
are required for obvious reasons. However, some of the disclosure
requirements are worthy of discussion.
For example, subsection (c)(2) requires the attorney to give the name
and address of the client. Subsection (c)(3) requires a general
description of the nature of the proposed representation. The purpose of
this subsection is not to force the attorney to divulge potentially
privileged information; rather, the "general description" language is
designed to protect client confidences while simultaneously giving the
State Bar sufficient information to determine whether the exception
sought is appropriate."7
Subsection (c)(7) requires that the attorney not be a resident of the
state of California. This provision is designed to prohibit individuals
who wish to practice in California from taking another jurisdiction's bar
examination-which, in all likelihood, will be less difficult to pass than
the California bar examination-then enlisting a California lawyer to
help her circumvent the general requirement that individuals practicing
law in California take the California bar examination."8 Subsection
117. For example, the State Bar may determine, based on the information given,
that the out-of-state attorney desires to represent the client in a pending proceeding. In
such a case, the State Bar will be able to inform the attorney that the exception is
inapplicable to pending proceedings and that she should follow the procedures set forth
in California Rule of Court 983.
118. This out-of-state residency requirement raises constitutional concerns. The
Constitution of the United States provides that "[tihe Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. Const.
art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. "The Privileges and Immunities Clause... imposes a direct restraint
on state action in the interests of interstate harmony.... It is discrimination against out-
of-state residents on matters of fundamental concern which triggers the Clause .. "
United Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208,
220 (1984) (citations omitted). Thus, the Supreme Court of the United States has held
that a state violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause when it requires residency as a
prerequisite to gaining admission to that state's bar by examination or by motion. See
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288 (1985); Supreme Court of
Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 70 (1988). One of the primary reasons why the
Privileges and Immunities Clause exists is to protect those who are disadvantaged by a
particular state practice and who have no recourse at the ballot box. See United Bldg.
and Constr. Trades Council, 465 U.S. at 217. Indeed, "[t]he Clause exists to protect
against those classifications that a State's political process cannot be relied on to
prevent... , not those that it can [be relied on to prevent]." Id. at 232-33 n.14
(Blacknun, J., dissenting).
(c)(8) prohibits an individual from regularly working in California. This
provision ensures that the individuals seeking the exemption are the
individuals which the exemption is intended to benefit: out-of-state
attorneys who regularly practice in their own jurisdiction. Subsection
(c)(9) largely overlaps (c)(8), although it prohibits the attorney from
regularly engaging in conduct which technically may not be "working"
in California and, thus, may not fall under (c)(8).
Subsection (c)(10) requires the attorney to subject herself to the
jurisdiction of California courts. This provision is essential, for it is the
vehicle through which the courts may punish the individual for acts
which would be punishable if the individual were a member of the State
Bar of California. Subsection (c)(11) requires the out-of-state attorney
to list all of the prior instances where the attorney has sought an
exemption to practice in California. The purpose of this subsection is to
provide the State Bar with information regarding the frequency of the
out-of-state attorney's contacts with California. Frequency of contacts,
in turn, tends to establish whether the attorney regularly works or
engages in professional activities in California and, hence, whether the
exemption should be granted.
Subsection (c)(12) forces the out-of-state attorney to affiliate local
counsel. This provision addresses the concern of subsection (a), which
is to minimize the number of instances where Californians receive
incompetent legal advice or representation."9 This provision further
requires the out-of-state attorney to obtain a written agreement of her
affiliation with local counsel. This subsection puts the burden on the
out-of-state attorney to establish the existence of an affiliation agreement
with local counsel. Those who are unable to establish such an
agreement risk a Birbrower l-type outcome, including a possible
inability to collect fees and a theoretical criminal prosecution.
The proposed amendment to section 6125 discriminates, if at all, against residents-
not out-of-state residents. Thus, the Privileges and Immunities Clause is not implicated.
The Northern District of California has held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause is
not violated when an in-state resident is at a disadvantage vis-a-vis an out-of-state
resident. See Paciulan v. George, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (holding
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not bar a state from granting out-of-state
residents limited privileges not offered to in-state residents). In fact, the Paciulan court
held that California Rule of Court 983-which requires that pro hac vice applicants not
be a resident of California-does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See
id. Thus, the proposed amendment, which is modeled after California Rule of Court 983,
is likewise constitutional.
119. Adopting an out-of-state attorney exception to section 6125 creates an
additional collateral benefit. Out-of-state clients of out-of-state attorneys will no longer
be required to retain California counsel on their own because the out-of-state attorneys
will be taking those steps in securing local counsel. Thus, there will be continuity of
representation as far as the clients are concerned. This benefit will impact California
clients if and when other states adopt an out-of-state attorney exception.
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Subsection (d) provides that an active member of the State Bar of
California who agrees to act as local counsel for an out-of-state attorney
assumes the risk of the out-of-state attorney's acts and omissions. This
provision reallocates some of the burden of policing the out-of-state
attorney from the State Bar to the member of the State Bar, who risks
professional discipline and civil liability for the acts and omissions of
the out-of-state attorney. Subsection (e) provides that the out-of-state
attorney shall be subject to disciplinary action of California courts if she
files a certificate containing false information or if she fails to comply
with California's standards of professional conduct. Subsection (f)
allows the State Bar to collect a reasonable fee. This pragmatic
provision allows the State Bar to defray the administrative cost
associated with determining whether the out-of-state attorney's
exemption should be granted.
Finally, subsection (g) provides that the new section 6125 is not
intended to change existing law except as specifically provided in the
amendment. Thus, the exemption would not alleviate the necessity of
seeking a pro hac vice exemption under California Rule of Court 983,
where necessary. Likewise, the exemption does not relieve the out-of-
state attorney of her duty to seek an exemption under section 1282.4 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure, when applicable. Rather, the
amendment to section 6125 is solely intended to provide an out-of-state
attorney with an avenue for representing a client on a limited basis when
it would otherwise be unclear whether the representation would violate
the unauthorized practice of law provision in section 6125(a).
VI. CONCLUSION
Birbrower, an out-of-state law firm with no attorneys licensed to
practice in California, was unable to collect the majority of its fairly
substantial legal fees because the Supreme Court of California
concluded that some of its attorneys had engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.'20 At the time Birbrower II was decided, California did
not recognize an exception to section 6125, which would have saved
Birbrower from the ramifications of section 6125. Subsequent
legislation has provided an exception for some arbitration proceedings, 2 '
but many out-of-state attorneys not involved in litigation or arbitration
120. See Birbrower II, supra note 3, at 7, 13.
121. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1282.4 (West Supp. 1999).
are left in limbo as to whether they are engaging in the unauthorized
practice of law. Accordingly, an "out-of-state attorney" exception to
section 6125, if carefully tailored to serve the dual interests of
Californians and the interstate nature of the legal profession, is a
laudable aspiration. Moreover, the California Legislature will be
making great strides toward expunging the State Bar's "arrogant" label,
while simultaneously reclaiming this state's status as a legislative and
judicial trailblazer.
JACK BALDERSON, JR.
